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JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF
DEREGULATION: EXPLORING THE
BOUNDARIES OF EXECUTIVE
DISCRETION
The American system of government emerged from the con-
flict between proponents of a strong central government (the Fed-
eralists),' and advocates of a decentralized system (the Anti-Feder-
alists).2  This philosophical debate, which began at the
I See THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 69 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); id. No. 78, at
523; W. MURPHY, THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM: STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE FOUNDING FA-
THERS AND THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 14 (1967).
2 See W. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 14. The Anti-Federalists believed that "democratic"
ideals could be better preserved in a decentralized form of government. See L. BANNING,
THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY 107 (1978) (protection of
individual liberties); C. PATTERSON, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES OF THOMAS JEFFERSON
52 (1953) (centralized government grave danger to liberty); ANTI-FEDERALISTS VERSUS FED-
ERALISTS, SELECTED DOCUMENTS 21-22 (J. Lewis ed. 1961) (central government would result
in emergence of ruling class with president as King).
The Federalists and the Anti-Federalists were sharply divided over the degree of sover-
eignty that the states should surrender to the federal government, and the United States
Constitution emerged as the result of a highly complex compromise between these two
schools of thought. See C. WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 744-80 (1928); Note,
Separating Myth from Reality in Federalism Decisions: A Perspective of American Feder-
alism-Past and Present, 35 VAND. L. REV. 161, 166-69 (1982). It was apparent at the Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787 that the Articles of Confederation provided an inadequate
mechanism for governing the nation. See W. GRAVES, AMERICAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS 61-64 (1964); Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declara-
tion of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, in AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY 1516 (1970). The Federalists asserted that a supreme central
government with strong executive and judicial branches was indispensable if the United
States was to attain credibility with other nations and protect the individual liberties of its
citizens. See W. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 14; THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 471 (A. Hamilton)
(J. Cooke ed. 1961); id. No. 78, at 523. The Federalists feared that a weak, decentralized
government would permanently debilitate the colonies. See W. MURPHY, supra note 1, at
31. It was argued that if individual states were allowed substantial dominion over domestic
and foreign policy, the peace and security of the nation would be threatened. See THE FED-
ERALIST No. 11, at 69 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); W. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 31;
Malone, Jefferson and the Rights of Man, in 2 JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME 161 (1951).
The Anti-Federalists, on the other hand, asserted that "democratic" ideals could be
best preserved by concentrating governmental power in small communities, thereby making
the governing body more accountable for its actions and more responsive to the needs of the
populace. See W. MURPHY, supra note 1, at 14. There was great concern that a highly cen-
tralized government would necessarily lead to an omnipotent ruling class that would inevita-
bly force states to relinquish their sovereignty. See Anonymous, Essay of an Old Whig, in 3
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Constitutional Convention of 1787,3 has continued to the present.4
Indeed, concern over the loss of state autonomy has been ex-
pressed by both courts and commentators,5 and, during the last
two decades, four presidents have attempted to transfer power and
responsibility back to state and local governments.6
THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 32 (J. Storing ed. 1981); Anonymous, "A Confederation for
Purposes Merely National . . ." in 4 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 6 (J. Storing ed.
1981); Speeches of Patrick Henry in the Virginia State Ratifying Convention, in 5 THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 222-224 (J. Storing ed. 1981).
See generally D. SMITH, THE CONVENTION AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE POLITICAL
IDEAS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 36-37 (1965) (Federalists enjoyed widespread support at
Convention until vigorous backlash of anti-federalist sentiment surfaced resulting in the
Connecticut Compromise); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 449 (M.
Farrand ed. 1966) (weakened central government proposed to protect individual states' com-
mercial interest).
' See D. SMITH, supra note 3, at 53. The controversy between the Federalist and Anti-
Federalist positions was not resolved by the compromise reached in 1787, and clashes be-
tween the proponents of national power and the defenders of state sovereignty continue to
occur. Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) (federal inter-
ference with "integral governmental functions" of a state will not be tolerated) with Cousins
v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491-92 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (state interest in preserv-
ing integrity of its elections outweighed by national interest in assuring equitable nominat-
ing process).
' See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855 (1976) (federal govern-
ment must not usurp integral state functions) ; Kaden, Politics, Money, and State Sover-
eignty: The Judicial Role, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 849 (1979) (ability of federal government
to preserve state sovereignty is questionable); Note, Taking Federalism Seriously: Limiting
State Acceptance of National Grants, 90 YALE L.J. 1694, 1700-01 (1981) (courts should set
more appropriate standards for limiting purview of national power). The recent re-evalua-
tion of the role of the federal government has been prompted by a belief that the federal
bureacracy has usurped areas that can be managed more efficiently on a local level. See, e.g.,
Freilich, Frye, & Carpenter, The New Federalism-American Urban Policy in the 1980s:
Trends and Directions in Urban, State and Local Government Law, 15 URB. LAW. 159, 162-
63 (1983) (proposals to transfer funding and decisionmaking authority to states based on
the fact that federal programs and regulations impede services and stifle creativity at local
level); Renz, The Effect of Federal Legislation on Historical State Powers of Pollution Con-
trol: Has Congress Muddied State Waters?, 43 MONT. L. REV. 197, 207-16 (1982) (federal
environmental legislation has resulted in usurpation of traditional state police powers).
6 See S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, DISMANTLING AMERICA: THE RUSH TO DEREGULATE 45
(1983); Amyx, New Federalism: How is it Working?, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 229, 229-31 (1976);
Lamb, "New Federalism" and Civil Rights, 9 U. TOL. L. REV. 816, 819-20 (1978); see also
Susskind, Revenue Sharing and the Lessons of the New Federalism, 8 URB. L. ANN. 33, 33
(1974) (discussing recent efforts by Congress to grant minimally restricted aid to states and
localities). The Nixon Administration initiated a "New Federalism" program in 1972 that
was designed to decentralize the decisionmaking process for domestic assistance programs.
See Amyx, supra, at 229, 231; Susskind, supra, at 33. President Ford sought to continue the
general revenue sharing program implemented by President Nixon past its termination date
of December 31, 1976. Amyx, supra, at 236. Strong opposition from Democrats in Congress
and various civil rights and low income groups, however, forestalled the continuation of the
program. Id. In addition, Presidents Nixon and Ford both attempted to encourage better
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President Ronald Reagan, the most vigorous presidential pro-
ponent of this trend, has pledged to restore state autonomy under
a program labeled "New Federalism,"7 and in so doing has reiter-
ated many of the arguments advanced during the original constitu-
tional debates by the advocates of state autonomy.8 President Rea-
gan's New Federalism is aimed at making the states as self-
working relationships with state and local governments through the use of Federal Regional
Councils (FRCs). See Lamb, supra, at 819-20. The FRCs worked closely with various state
agencies to ensure that services and financial assistance would be allocated to the most de-
serving areas. See id. at 820-21. The Carter Administration took yet a different approach to
deregulation. See S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, supra, at 45; see also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657
F.2d 298, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (President Carter's supervision of administrative agencies
deemed perfectly in accord with intent of framers). See generally O'Reilly, Judicial Review
of Agency Deregulation: Alternatives and Problems for the Courts, 37 VAND. L. REv. 509,
515-16 (1984) (discussion of Carter Administration's deregulatory activities). For a discus-
sion of the Reagan Administration's approach to deregulation, see infra notes 7-21 and ac-
companying text.
7 See President Reagan's Inaugural Address, PUB. PAPERS 1 (Jan. 20, 1981) [hereinafter
cited as Inaugural Address]. In his Inaugural Address, President Reagan emphasized that
the purview of federal power had become too extensive. See id. at 2.
President Reagan articulated some of the elements of his New Federalism program in
his State of the Union Message on January 26, 1982. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 27, 1982, at A18,
col. 1. Under this program, the federal government was to assume full responsibility for the
cost of the Medicaid program and the states were to bear the entire expense of funding
"more than 40" programs, including the Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)
and food stamp programs. See id. At first, the state costs for these programs were to be
satisfied by existing federal excise taxes deposited in a "grassroots trust fund." See N.Y.
Times, Jan. 29, 1982, at A18, col. 1. The states could then elect to receive federal grants
from these trust funds to subsidize state expenditures for education, transportation, and
social services between 1984 and 1988. See id. Moreover, any state could choose to abstain
from participation in federal grant programs and still retain the right to obtain trust fund
accumulations for state use. See id. at col. 3. Starting in fiscal year 1988, the federal excise
taxes were to be reduced by 25% a year for a period of 4 years. See id. When these excise
taxes were eventually terminated, the states could either levy taxes to make up for the lost
federal contributions or abort the programs altogether. Id. President Reagan was unable to
implement this policy, however, due to vigorous state opposition to the shift in fiscal respon-
sibility for Medicaid and AFDC programs. See N.Y. Times, August 10, 1982, at B7, col. 5.
For a general discussion of the elements of New Federalism see Peterson, The State and
Local Sector, in THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT 157-217 (1982).
' See, e.g., Inaugural Address, supra note 7, at 2; Address at Commencement Exercises
at the University of Notre Dame, PUB. PAPERS 431, 433 (May 17, 1981). In a speech at Notre
Dame University, President Reagan stated that "[flederalism, with its built in checks and
balances, has been distorted. Central government has usurped powers that properly belong
to local and State governments. And in so doing. . . [the] central government has begun to
fail to do the things that are truly the responsibility of a central government." Id. Many of
President Reagan's observations on a centralized government resemble predictions made by
early American statesmen who feared that a strong national government would usurp state
sovereignty. See, e.g., C. PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 110-11 (centralized government
presents great danger to state authority and personal liberty).
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sufficient as possible.9 By reallocating substantial amounts of gov-
ernmental responsibility and allowing states and municipalities the
freedom to experiment with a wide range of social and economic
programs, 10 New Federalists have sought to reverse the alleged fed-
eral usurpation of governmental control that has occurred during
former administrations.1 The Reagan Administration, moreover,
has adopted policies that emphasize and encourage federal deregu-
lation 12 by focusing on the removal of regulations that allegedly
9 See Palmer & Sawhill, Perspectives on the Reagan Experiment, in THE REAGAN Ex-
PERIMENT 1-2 (1982). During the 1970's, many federal assistance programs flowed directly to
cities, counties, and other local government entities. See id. at 11. The Reagan Administra-
tion, however, chose to deal principally with the states. Id. at 10. President Reagan's inten-
tion was to make "[flederal, state, and local governments . . . almost fully responsible for
financing their own services." Id. at 12.
'0 See WHITE HOUSE REPORT ON THE PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY, PUB. PAPERS
116 (Feb. 18, 1981) [hereinafter cited as PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY]. President Rea-
gan proposed reducing the budget in nine areas, with the effect of reducing social programs
and shifting the burden of these programs to either the states or the direct beneficiaries. Id.
at 120. In addition, some programs were to be entirely eliminated. Id.; see REAGAN'S FIRST
YEAR 58-59 (M. McNeil ed. 1982). The CETA job program was eliminated, Pell grants,
which subsidized education for low-income students, were reduced, and school feeding pro-
grams were severely curtailed. See REAGAN'S FIRST YEAR, supra, at 58-59. While the private
sector would initially bear some of the costs of this reduction, the belief was that if the
states stepped in to fill the void left by federal withdrawal, all the above-mentioned pro-
grams would effectively shift to state control. See Peterson, supra note 7, at 168-69.
" See supra text accompanying notes 5-6; see also J. GUNTHER, ROOSEVELT IN RETRO-
SPECT 279 (1950). President Roosevelt's New Deal agencies were the source of much of the
regulation that developed on the federal level. J. GUNTHER, supra, at 279. In the famous
Hundred Days following President Roosevelt's inauguration the balance of power was
shifted radically from the states and private sector to the federal government. Id. at 279-80.
The Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA), Securities Exchange Commission
(SEC), Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC), and the National Industrial Recovery Act,
which produced the NRA (a precursor to the NLRA), all emerged from this substantial
reallocation of power. Id.; cf. J. PATTERSON, THE NEW DEAL AND THE STATES 50 (1969)
(Roosevelt Administration fostered the "most rapid extension of federal welfare in Ameri-
can history"). The Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) provided unemploy-
ment assistance payments that were matched by state funds on a three-to-one ratio. J. PAT-
TERSON, supra, at 50.
Twenty-five years later, the Kennedy Administration continued to espouse the New
Deal philosophy that the federal government should assume the responsibility for solving
the country's most basic problems. See J. KENNEDY, THE BURDEN AND THE GLORY 215, 220
(1963) (potential problem of unemployment for baby-boom generation must be solved by
government job programs).
12 S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, supra note 6, at 21; see Eads & Fix, Regulatory Policy, in
THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT 137 (1982); O'Reilly, supra note 6, at 514-15; see also Wash. Post,
Feb. 21, 1981, at Al, col. 4 (agency officials compiled list of major health, safety, environ-
mental, and social regulations they will alter). The Reagan Administration's drive to deregu-
late began with an immediate 60-day freeze on the promulgation of regulations, see Exec.
Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982), and the formation
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have curtailed the creativity of industry."3
In addition, the Reagan Administration has restructured much
of the federal grant program by consolidating numerous categorical
grants into block grants. 4 Previously, most federal subsidies were
disbursed through categorical grants accompanied by administra-
tive requirements designed to implement federal policies.' 5 Block
of the Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief, see id. The Task Force was charged
with the duty of targeting agencies and programs in need of deregulation. See id. Agencies
charged with the responsibility for administering federal regulations experienced sharp
budget cuts and personnel reductions. See REGULATION: PROCESS AND POLITICS 68-69 (M.
Gottron ed. 1982). To discourage litigation, encourage voluntary compliance with agency
determinations, and transfer the burden of the regulatory enforcement to the states, the
Administration initiated drastic reductions in agency enforcement activities. See Eads &
Fix, supra, at 140-41. Many social, economic, and environmental regulations affecting state
and local governments were eliminated. See id. at 141-42; REGULATION: PROCESS AND POLIT-
Ics, supra, at 69. Nine specific deregulatory guidelines were proposed by President Reagan:
- Preserve "the social safety net."
- Revise entitlements to eliminate unintended benefits.
- Reduce subsidies to middle- and upper-income groups.
- Impose fiscal restraint on other national interest programs.
- Recover costs that can be clearly allocated to users.
- Stretch-out and retarget public sector capital investment programs.
- Reduce overhead and personnel costs of the Federal Government.
- Apply sound economic criteria to subsidy programs.
- Consolidate categorical grant programs into block grants.
PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY, supra note 10, at 120; see also FEDERALISM: THE FIRST
10 MONTHS: A REPORT FROM THE PRESIDENT 7 (1981) (local levels of government would be
permitted to establish own regulatory methods); G. HALE & M. PALLEY, THE POLITICS OF
FEDERAL GRANTS 101 (1981) (federal agencies request unnecessary information and burden-
some, overlapping reports); Interview with Reporters on Federalism, PUB. PAPERS 1077
(Nov. 19, 1981) (federal government has become involved in areas never before deemed its
province). Responding to a request for examples of appropriate federal and state regula-
tions, President Reagan cited education and welfare as examples of federal regulation sti-
fling the ability of the states to perform functions that can be more efficiently executed on a
local level. Interview with Reporters in Federalism, PUm. PAPERS 1077 (Nov. 19, 1981).
"3 See S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, supra note 6, at 20-21. It has been suggested that
deregulation has increased the level of commercial productivity, see Deregulating America,
Bus. WK., Nov. 28, 1983, at 80, col. 1, and has, in effect, compelled business management to
focus its attention on market needs instead of federal regulations, see Robertson, Ward &
Caldwell, Deregulation: Surviving the Transition, HARV. Bus. REV. July-Aug. 1982 at 20.
" See Palmer & Sawbill, supra note 9, at 12.
15 See C. BARFIELD, RETHINKING FEDERALISM: BLOCK GRANTS AND FEDERAL, STATE AND
LOCAL RESPONSIBILITIES 1 (1981); Stenberg, Federalism in Transition: 1959-79, reprinted in
"The Future of Federalism in the 1980's," REPORT AND PAPERS FROM THE CONFERENCE ON
THE FUTURE OF FEDERALISM 30 (Alexandria, Va. July 25-26, 1980). The regulations accompa-
nying grants often imposed heavy burdens upon the accepting states, which frequently re-
sulted in states refusing to accept the funds to avoid regulatory compliance. See Cappalli,
Mandates Attached to Federal Grants: Sweet and Sour Federalism, 13 URB. LAW. 143, 144-
45 (1981) (grant policies in combination are having serious detrimental effect); Erwin, Feder-
alism and Federal Grants in Aid, 43 N.C.L. REV. 487, 495 (1964-65) (fund-matching re-
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grants, on the other hand, are dispersed as lump-sum payments
that permit state governments to determine how to allocate the
funds to specific facilities and programs."6
New Federalism's emphasis on deregulation, as directed at
federal agencies, is aimed at both existing and proposed regula-
tions. 17 The major cause of this curtailment of regulatory activity
is Executive Order 12,291,18 under which agencies are effectively
compelled to send regulations, finalized drafts of rules, and regula-
tory impact analyses to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB).19 The OMB has been granted the power to review the
quirements often draw revenue away from important programs); Tomlinson & Mashaw, The
Enforcement of Federal Standards in Grant-in-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary
Involvement, 58 VA. L. REV. 600, 610 (1972) (federal regulations have been criticized for
improperly intruding on grant recipients); Note, supra note 5, at 1695 (conditional grants
impact on traditional areas of state power).
16 See G. HALE & M. PALLEY, supra note 12, at 109; U.S. ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, BLOCK GRANTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 6 (Washington,
D.C. U.S. Government Printing Office 1979); FEDERALISM: THE FIRST 10 MONTHS: A REPORT
FROM THE PRESIDENT, supra note 12, at 13. It should be noted that all federal funding for
block-grant-subsidized programs eventually will be eliminated. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1981
at A10, col. 1. Whether the states will be able to bear the costs of these programs remains to
be seen. Compare Peterson, supra note 7, at 179 (Urban Institute survey indicates most
states will be able to replace federal funding lost to Reagan budget cuts) with Muller, Re-
gional Impacts, in THE REAGAN EXPERIMENT 457 (1982) ("[o]n the whole, President Rea-
gan's policies will widen economic and fiscal disparities between wealthy and growing states,
on the one hand, and less affluent and economically vital states, on the other hand") and
Comment, Passing the Bucks: Procedural Protections Under Federal Block Grants, 18
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 231, 232 (1983) (block grants may have devastating effects on poor
since funding for relief programs was cut and states will not likely be able to supplement
lost revenue).
'7 See PROGRAM FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY, supra note 10, at 128. "Future regulatory
reform efforts will be directed not only at proposed regulations, but also at existing regula-
tions and regulatory statutes that are particularly burdensome." Id.; see also S. TOLCHIN &
M. TOLCHIN supra note 6, at 41 ("Reagan appointees, who shared their President's commit-
ment to reduce regulatory burden ... did not hesitate to quash regulations despite profes-
sional staff advice, or the number of years it took to develop those rules"); O'Reilly, supra
note 6, at 514-16 (Reagan's approach to deregulation was blatantly political; previous ad-
ministrations did regulate but stayed within economic sphere, avoiding health, environmen-
tal, and social categories).
'8 Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (1982).
19 See id. While the Executive Branch cannot legally force administrative agencies to
follow the dictates of Executive Order 12,291, the fact that the President can remove those
agency heads who fail to comply with policy directives virtually assures agency compliance.
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6:40, at 150 (Supp. 1982); see infra note 30 and
accompanying text.
Those agencies that have chosen to adhere to Executive Order 12,291 are required to
submit a regulatory impact analysis for all major regulations, and were directed to apply a
cost-benefit analysis to the rulemaking process. See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127
(1981), reprinted in 5 U.S.C § 601 (1982). In his prefatory remarks, President Reagan de-
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findings of the agency to determine whether further investigation,
subsequent revision, or a total rescission of existing rules and regu-
lations is warranted.20 The likelihood of compliance with Executive
Order 12,291 is increased by President Reagan's appointment of
agency heads who are sympathetic to the needs of industry.2 '
One of the goals of New Federalism-to increase the amount
of responsibility assumed by state governments 22-raises a number
of questions requiring judicial resolution.23 In addition, deregula-
cdared that the purpose of the order was "to reduce the burdens of existing and future
regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, provide for presidential
oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations, and
insure well-reasoned regulations ... " Id. "The power to review [agency regulations] . . . is
exercised by. . .the Office of Management and Budget [(OMB)], under the supervision of
the Director, subject to the direction of [a] Task Force . . .headed by the Vice-President
and composed mainly of cabinet officers." K. DAvIS, supra note 19, § 6.40, at 147.
2 See 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 § 3(f) (1-2) (1981); REGULATION: PROCESS AND POLITICS, supra
note 12, at 67.
22 See S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, supra note 6, at 86; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept.
26, 1983, at 51-53. The appointment of key personnel devoted to the Reagan philosophy of
"getting the government off the backs of the people" is an essential component of the Rea-
gan Administration's regulatory policy. See S. TOLCmN & M. TOLCHIN, supra note 6, at 41.
Many of the Reagan appointees have extensive private-sector experience in combating the
efforts of regulatory agencies. See id. at 97. For example, Thorne Auchter, current head of
the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), operated a construction com-
pany that was cited for numerous OSHA violations. See id.; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Sept. 23, 1983, at 53. Attempting to achieve deregulation by changing the supervisory per-
sonnel rather than the controlling statute increases the temptation for an aggressive admin-
istrator to overstep his legal bounds. See Eads & Fix, supra note 12, at 148.
22 See Peterson, supra note 7, at 159. The Reagan Administration's regulatory policy is
based, in part, upon the belief that program administration is more cost-effective at the
lower levels of government. See Eads & Fix, supra note 12, at 141. With a sharp decrease in
federal regulations, the states have been left to fill the void in the areas of social and eco-
nomic regulation. See REGULATION: PROCESS AND POLITICS, supra note 12, at 69. Despite the
proposed transfer of federal funds to the states, there has been concern that state and local
governments may not possess the resources required to fund expensive regulatory programs.
Id. at 68; see, e.g., S. TOLCmN & M. TOLCHIN, supra note 6, at 254-55 (inability of states to
handle financial burden has resulted in drastic cuts in state environmental programs); see
also supra note 16.
23 See, e.g., infra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. Courts have questioned the meth-
ods used by the Reagan Administration in its efforts to deregulate. See, e.g. International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 816-17 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (Secre-
tary of Labor's initiative to rescind longstanding rules prohibiting working at home without
examining alternative proposals was "antithetical to reasoned decisionmaking"); Center for
Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 710 F.2d 842, 846-47 (D.C. Cir.
1983). In Center for Auto Safety, the Reagan Administration's version of the National
Highway Transportation Safety Administration rescinded the Carter Administration's pol-
icy to call for public hearings on fuel efficiency. See id. at 844-45. The Court of Appeals
dismissed the action on the ground of ripeness, but noted that the change appeared to con-
flict with congressional mandates. Id. at 846-47 (dictum).
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tion creates difficulties for courts that are called upon to review its
legality while avoiding unnecessary interference with executive dis-
cretion24 and without abandoning jurisdictional limitations.25 This
Note will examine executive policy decisions underlying the Rea-
gan Administration's deregulatory activities and will suggest re-
forming the deregulatory process to provide a more equitable
method for restoring state sovereignty and economic indepen-
dence. In addition, the Note will explore the substantive and pro-
cedural due process ramifications of federal deregulation.
REVIEWABILITY OF EXECUTIVE POLICY DECISIONS
Many federal regulations promulgated over the past one hun-
dred years have emerged from a hostile and uncompromising ex-
change between administrators of federal agencies and their re-
spective charges.26 While deregulation arguably has brought about
substantial improvements,27 the methods employed to implement
this program raise significant issues concerning the purview of ex-
ecutive power.28
President Reagan has obtained unprecedented control over
the federal rulemaking process through the issuance of Executive
24 Cf. FTC v. Mandel Bros., 359 U.S. 385, 392-93 (1959) (proper scope of review is "to
determine if the trier of fact has exercised "allowable discretion"); United States v. Hus-
band R. (Roach), 453 F.2d 1054, 1054-60 (5th Cir. 1971) (great weight given to longstanding
interpretation by executive of authority of governor of the canal zone); Department of Agri-
culture v. Willey, 275 F.2d 264, 272 (8th Cir. 1960) ("administrative construction of an Act
is entitled to great weight").
25 See, e.g., Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546-47 (1978) (judiciary may not impose hybrid rulemaking require-
ments); Association of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151-12 (1970)
(standing requirements); see also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 116-18 (1926) (sepa-
ration of powers doctrine mandates that Congress cannot force President to reinstate cabi-
net officer).
20 See S. TOLCHIN & M. TOLCHIN, supra note 6, at 17. Federal regulatory activity has
increased at an incredible rate since the late 1880's, in part because of necessity and in part
because the public, industry, and interest groups have demanded it. See F. HEFFRON & N.
MCFEELY, THE ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATORY PROCEss 3 (1983). Unfortunately, it has been
suggested that many of the regulatory requireinents imposed by administrative agencies
have become so onerous that, in the last three decades, expansion and creativity have been
greatly curtailed.
27 See, e.g., Deregulating America, Bus. WK., Nov. 28, 1983 at 81, cols. 1-3 (long-dis-
tance air fares, trucking rates, cost of phones, cost of buying stock from brokers, and mort-
gage rates have decreased). The elimination of certain federal regulations has not only revi-
talized several American industries, but also has improved the nation's economic forecast.
See id. at 80, col. 1.
28 See infra notes 30-64.
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Order 12,291, which provides for substantive review of agency reg-
ulations by the Office of Management and Budget.2 9 Although, in
theory, this order does not transfer rulemaking power to the Presi-
dent or the OMB, such is its practical effect.30 While courts have
recognized the validity and enforceability of executive orders,"'
such orders appear in certain respects to be incompatible with the
separation of powers doctrine.32 In addition, a President's percep-
29 See supra note 19 and accompanying text; K. DAVIS, supra note 19, § 6:40, at 149-51;
S. TOLCHIN & M.TOLCHIN, supra note 6, at 127. President Reagan's regulatory involvement
exceeds that of President Carter. See K. DAVIS, supra note 19, § 6:40, at 149. In addition to
creating regulatory organizations to coordinate rulemaking and to supervise regulatory anal-
ysis, President Carter actively participated in the administrative rulemaking procedure. Id.;
see also Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405-06 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (deference given to
President Carter's participation in rulemaking procedure of executive agency validated). Re-
lying upon the Sierra Club holding, the Reagan Administration undertook an extensive pro-
gram of Presidential intervention in agency rulemaking by using the OMB as a regulatory
clearinghouse. See Wash. Post, July 29, 1981, at A17, col.'l.
30 K. DAVIS, supra note 19, § 6:40, at 150 (citing § 3(f)(3) of the Executive Order
("[n]othing in this subsection shall be construed as displacing the agencies' responsibilities
delegated by law"). While the President cannot actually compel an agency to transfer
rulemaking power to another body, any cabinet officer or policymaking subordinate who
does not comply with the order risks removal from office. Id. (citing Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926)).
3, See, e.g., Moehl v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 84 F. Supp. 427, 431 (N.D. Ill.
1947) (properly promulgated executive orders have force of law).
31 Chemeninsky, Controlling Inherent Presidential Power: Providing a Framework for
Judicial Review, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 863, 891 & n.150 (1983); Noyes, Executive Orders, Presi-
dential Intent, and Private Rights of Action, 59 TEx. L. REV. 837, 842-43 (1981); see also
Comment, Executive Orders and the Development of Presidential Power, 17 VILL. L. REV.
688, 711-12 (1972); Comment, Presidential Legislation by Executive Order, 37 U. COLo. L.
REV. 105, 117-18 (1964).
While it has been recognized that the president can play an important and necessary
role in the formation of agency policy, see Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298, 405-06 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), presidential directives cannot properly induce agencies to ignore legislative pri-
orities or avoid statutory mandates, see, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795, 828 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (administrative agencies must implement
statutes in a rational manner because they are the products of democratic decisionmaking);
National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 765-67 (3d Cir. 1982) (ad-
herence to Executive Order held not justification for failure to comply with the APA);
O'Reilly, supra note 6, at 525 n.99 (agencies are subject to judicial review and should act
pursuant to legislative intent and not political motivation); Note, Judicial Review of Ad-
ministrative Inaction, 83 COLuM. L. REV. 627, 679 (1983) (agencies ought not to rely on
Presidential acts that are contrary to Congressional preference); see H. FRIENDLY, THE FED-
ERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 153 (1962) (Presidential involvement in regulatory process
highly questionable).
Although the Sierra Club and Donovan decisions may themselves be somewhat viola-
tive of the separation of powers doctrine since "the Constitution does not authorize a fed-
eral court to interfere in [a] policy decision of another branch of government if that policy is
rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose," Johnson v. Smith, 696 F.2d 1334,
1338 (11th Cir 1983) (quoting New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 594 (1976)),
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tion of "national policy" is likely to be more one-sided than is a
policy set by compromise reached through the legislative process.3
It is submitted that the most disturbing aspect of Executive
Order 12,291 is its apparent incompatibility with sections 553(c)
and 706(2)(A) of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act
(APA). 4 As has been noted, agencies complying with Executive
Order 12,291 must send all proposed rules, final rules, and regula-
tory impact analyses to OMB.3 5 Although a rulemaking agency is
compelled by section 553(c) of the APA to receive evidence from
executive officials are, nonetheless, required to remain within constitutional boundaries, see
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 788, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The requirement that executive action conform to the Constitution applies to the President.
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (exertions of presidential
power contrary to express or implied will of Congress will be closely examined for constitu-
tional improprieties).
When a President issues an order that is inconsistent with a federal statute or congres-
sional intent, his power is at its lowest level and the order is valid only if congressional
action is constitutionally barred. See id. (Jackson, J., concurring). Compare Humphrey's
Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (as creator of administrative agencies,
Congress can forbid President from removing presidential appointee for reasons other than
those delineated by statute) with Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926) (Presi-
dent's power to remove officer from executive agency cannot be denied by Congress).
"' See Note, supra note 32, at 641, 679. Notwithstanding statutory and constitutional
limitations, executive controls tend to be unresponsive to local concerns since the President
is primarily responsible for addressing national concerns. See id. at 641 & n.98. In addition,
since the President is but one of several voices that shape national policy, presidential pol-
icy alone is not indicative of the national will. Id. at 679; cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 819,
__ 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2782 (1983) (Framers intended lawmaking power to be shared by
Congress and the President).
'4 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982), § 706(2)(A). Section 553(c) of the Administrative Proce-
dure Act (APA) provides in pertinent part-
(c) After notice required by this section, the agency shall give interested persons
an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written
data, views, or arguments with or without opportunity for oral presentation. After
consideration of the relevant matter presented, the agency shall incorporate in the
rules adopted a concise general statement of their basis and purpose.
Id. § 553(c). Section 706 of the APA provides in pertinent part:
To the extent necessary to decision and when presented, the reviewing court
shall decide all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory
provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action. The reviewing court shall-
(2) hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found
to be-
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in ac-
cordance with law.
Id. § 706.
35 Exec. Order No. 12,291 § 3(c), 3 C.F.R. 127, 129-30 (1982), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. §
601 (1982); see supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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all affected parties3 6 and to weigh this evidence in its final determi-
nation, 37 the OMB is under no such obligation under the Executive
Order. 38 Furthermore, it is submitted that the highly secretive
decisionmaking process used by the OMB in reviewing proposed
regulations39 is hardly consistent with a concept of open
government.
Under section 706(2)(A) of the APA, agency rulemaking will
be deemed unlawful if it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of dis-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law."4 0 Agency deci-
sions that are not supported by substantial evidence or are not in
accordance with statutory requirements are generally deemed vio-
lative of these provisions of the APA.4' In Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turer's Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.,42 for example, the United States Supreme Court deemed
'8 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982).
See id.
38 See K. DAvis, supra note 19, § 6:40, at 152-53. As Professor Davis has indicated,
Executive Order 12,291, in its original form, would increase the risk that relevant factual
information would not be given due consideration. See id. While most presidents have
maintained some level of control over the administrative process, the manner and scope of
Presidential intervention should be subject to the limitations of § 553. Id. Under the origi-
nal version, once the final rule of the agency is turned over to OMB, "it can be altered by
someone who (a) is not required to consider the written comments, (b) does not in fact
ordinarily consider them, (c) considers other facts and influences that may be kept secret,
and (d) does in fact keep secret the new facts and influences." K. DAvIs, supra note 19, §
6:40, at 153.
31 K. DAVIS, supra note 19, § 6:40, at 153 (OMB reluctant to go before congressional
investigative committee). OMB scrutiny is contrary to judicial precedent requiring that
rules must be rational in light of the facts and ideas presented to the agency. K. DAVIS,
supra note 19, § 6:40, at 156-59; see, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 34-35 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (court should determine if agency decision is based on "a consideration of relevant
factors"), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). OMB and Task Force decisions would seem to
violate this precedent, since both groups are authorized to act without revealing any of the
information upon which their decisions are based. K. DAVIS, supra note 19, § 6:40, at 153;
see also Wash. Post, July 29, 1981, at A17, col. 3 (OMB criticized as "backdoor" policy
maker).
,o 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
41 See, e.g., Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n,
673 F.2d 425, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (notice and opportunity to be heard expressly required by
APA when revoking a rule), af'd, 103 S. Ct. 3556 (1983); Wawszkiewicz v. Department of
Treasury, 670 F.2d 296, 301 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (when reviewing under the "arbi-
trary and capricious" standard, court must consider "relevant factors") (quoting Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971)); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC,
567 F.2d 9, 35 (D.C. Cir.) (§ 706(2)(A) requires a "rational connection between facts found
and choices made") (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156,
168 (1962)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
," 463 U.S. 29, 103 S. Ct. 2856 (1983).
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agency rescission of existing safety regulations "arbitrary and ca-
pricious" because the agency failed to supply a sufficient explana-
tion for the revocation.43 The Court stated that an agency must
scrutinize all pertinent data and supply a reasoned analysis for its
decision.44 Justice White determined that the agency had improp-
erly relied "on factors which Congress had not intended it to con-
sider, entirely fail[ed] to consider an important aspect of the prob-
lem, and offer[ed] an explanation for its decision that [ran]
counter to the evidence before the agency.'45
Similarly, in International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union
v. Donovan,48 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that the Secretary of Labor's decision to remove re-
strictions on the employment of homeworkers in the textile indus-
try was arbitrary and capricious. 47 The court admonished the Rea-
gan Administration for its failure to follow the congressional intent
behind the Fair Labor Standards Act.48 It is submitted that the
holdings in Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Association and Inter-
national Ladies' Garment Workers' Union demonstrate the con-
tinued need for judicial review of agency rule rescissions, especially
when those rescissions are the product of unchecked oversight by
the OMB acting in its capacity as a regulatory clearinghouse, to
ensure that agency responsibilities are not being treated in an arbi-
" See id. at 2862. In State Farm, the National Highway Transportation Safety Admin-
istration (NHTSA) rescinded a passive restraint requirement for automobiles, based upon a
determination that such devices were no longer feasible. Id. at 2864. The Court refused to
accept the lack of feasibility as an adequate explanation for the rescission. See id.
44 Id. at 2866-67.
45 Id. at 2867.
48 722 F.2d 795 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
47 Id. at 815.
41 Id. at 828. Judge Edwards was highly critical of the Reagan Administration in Dono-
van, stating:
We recognize that a new administration may try to effectuate new philosophies
that have been implicitly endorsed by the democratic process. Nonetheless, it is
axiomatic that the leaders of every administration are required to adhere to the
dictates of statutes that are also products of democratic decisionmaking. Unless
officials of the Executive Branch can convince Congress to change the statutes
they find objectionable, their duty is to implement the statutory mandates in a
rational manner.
Id. (citing with approval Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, - 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2875 (1983)); see also Office of Communication of United
Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1443 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (criticizing FCC for overly
aggressive deregulation). See generally N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1983, col. 2 (International La-
dies' Garment Workers' Union symbolic confrontation between Reagan Administration der-
egulators and New Deal regulators).
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trary and capricious manner.
SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
State and federal governmental activities are subject to due
process review49 that must be both procedural-to guarantee a fair
decisionmaking process5 -- and substantive-to ensure that legisla-
tive enactments are consistent with the Constitution. 1 It is sug-
gested that the regulatory changes made pursuant to the New Fed-
eralism present issues of both substantive and procedural due
process whenever a liberty or property interest is involved.52 The
"9 U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV § 1. The Due process Clause of the fifth amendment
provides in relevant part: "No person shall be ... deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." Id. The fifth amendment due process provision has been held
applicable to the federal government only. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 243, 247 (1833). Due process limitations are imposed upon the states by the fourteenth
amendment. See Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1977); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
50 Procedural due process assures that a fair decisionmaking process will be employed
before the government engages in any activity restricting a person's life, liberty or property.
See, e.g., SchaU v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984). (juveniles entitled to procedural and sub-
stantive due process); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1971) (procedural due
process protects life, liberty, or property); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1970) (proce-
dural due process requires state to provide a forum before depriving plaintiff of driver's
license).
Procedural due process requires a consideration of three factors: first, the individual
liberty or property interest at issue; second, the extent to which additional or alternative
procedural safeguards would reduce the possibility of erroneous decisionmaking; and third,
the governmental interest in maintaining the current procedures, including the financial and
administrative burdens that alternative standards would generate. See Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 335 (1975). The criteria set forth in Mathews have received uniform recogni-
tion. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 560 (2d ed. 1983).
" The Supreme Court has articulated several standards to review whether a statute or
regulation complies substantively with the Due Process Clause. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, supra note 50, at 449-51. If an enactment has a debilitating effect on an indi-
vidual's fundamental rights, the government must show that the enactment is necessitated
by a compelling state interest. See Schall v. Martin, 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984) (right to adjudi-
cation of guilt before punishment). Conversely, legislative pronouncements that infringe on
non-fundamental rights will be upheld so long as the court can find that the enactment is
rationally related to a legitimate government interest. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,
300 U.S. 379, 381 (1937); see also Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164, 1176 (5th Cir.
1979) (regulation does not violate substantive due process if it is rationally related to a
legitimate government end). Yet another standard, the "middle-tier test," compels the gov-
ernment in certain circumstances to be substantially related to achievement of "important
governmental objectives." See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Stanton v. Stanton,
421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971).
52 See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 50, at 460. Id. The concept of
property under the due process clause is quite broad. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254,
264 (1970) (extending concept of "property" to public assistance payments). Goldberg con-
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current block grant program, for example, has been criticized for
its alleged failure to provide sufficient procedural safeguards to in-
dividuals who previously had enjoyed substantial federal protec-
tion under the categorical grant program.5 3 In addition, it is sug-
gested that deregulation has been accomplished through
procedural improprieties, manifested by reluctance on the part of
cerned the distribution of Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Id. at 255-56.
The Goldberg Court held that the entitlement to receive AFDC payments was "property,"
and, therefore, recipients must be afforded a hearing before benefits can be terminated. Id.
at 264. AFDC and other similar entitlements are now covered by federal block grants. Com-
ment, supra note 16, at 236. Since statutory entitlements include "many of the core values
of unqualified liberty," the government cannot withdraw such opportunities without com-
plying with the requirements of procedural due process. L. TRmIE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW 516-17 (1978) (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972)); see also
O'Reilly, supra note 6, at 552 (adjudication of life sustaining benefit entitlements requires
due process safeguards).
While some commentators note that the Due Process Clause usually has not been ap-
plied to agency acts, see O'Reilly, supra note 6, at 552, and, thus, agency deprivation of due
process is not a basis for judicial review, Note, supra note 32, at 632, it is submitted that
disregard for statutory mandates warrants due process review if an agency fails to provide a
fair decisionmaking process to an individual.
83 See Comment, supra note 16, at 232-33. The public hearing requirements of certain
block grants are not well structured, and many states have combined the hearings for block
grant allocation plans with hearings designed to determine appropriation of state monies.
Id. at 240. Open hearings are inhibited further by the absence of restrictions on the state's
methods of data collection and fund allocation. Id. at 241. Moreover, courts will not impose
higher standards on an administrative agency than are contained in the enabling statute of
that agency. Id.; cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (courts usually are precluded from forcing agencies to
employ procedural requirements beyond those formulated by Congress).
While an individual may file a complaint alleging a failure to comply with block grant
legislation, the only clear remedy available is to deny the state access to the federal subsi-
dies. Comment, supra note 16, at 245 (citing 45 C.F.R. § 96.51 (1982)). The injured benefi-
ciary has no direct relief. Comment, supra note 16, at 245-46. Furthermore, such preclusion
from the appeals process has not been offset by adequate complaint procedures. See id. at
246-47. While it has been contended that legal remedies such as state administrative proce-
dure acts are available to challenge these procedural deficiencies, see id. at 267-80, it is
submitted that future federal assistance programs should be formulated so that the proce-
dural inadequacies in current block grants will be avoided in the first instance.
Because strict federal restrictions are not included in block grants, it has been con-
tended that groups with little political influence will be at an extreme disadvantage. Id. at
233. The shift of authority over the disbursement of grants is especially problematic for
indigents who receive assistance from these grants, since, although they possess the greatest
need for aid, they generally command the least political influence. See id. at 232. It has also
been noted that when there is no controlling federal statute, states often refuse to recognize
expectations set forth in the Constitution and in Supreme Court decisions. See generally
Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133, 1135
(1977) (state autonomy was primary source of governmental abuse in pre-Civil War
America).
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agency officials to implement controlling legislation,54 and by at-
tempts to circumvent certain judicial and statutory mandates."
Such arbitrary conduct on the part of governmental entities in
other contexts has been held violative of the due process clause.56
It is submitted that judicial intervention in arbitrary agency
deregulatory action is highly appropriate because, left unchecked,
these decisionmaking processes would unduly infringe due process
guarantees. 57 It is further submitted that the middle-tier analy-
51 See, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 722 F.2d 795,
828 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Donovan I) (recission of ban on homework in the knitwear industry
found to be abdication of Secretary of Labor's duty to implement Fair Labor Standards
Act); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 817-18 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(EPA deferred permit processing without notice or comment in violation of APA); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 683 F.2d 752, 768 (3d Cir. 1982) (EPA's postpone-
ment of effective date of final amendments to regulations promulgated pursuant to Clean
Water Act without notice or comment found to be a violation of APA).
5 See, e.g., International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Donovan, 733 F.2d 920,
921 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Donovan II) (avoidance of judcial mandate); Public Citizen v. Steed,
733 F.2d 93, 94 (D.C. Cir 1983) (avoidance of statutory mandate). In Donovan I, the court
held that the Secretary of Labor's rescission of homework restrictions in the knitted
outerwear industry was arbitrary and capricious, and ordered the Secretary to reinstate the
restrictions. Donovan I, 722 F.2d 795, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The Secretary subsequently
issued a final "emergency" rule that suspended the effect of the court's decision for 120
days. Donovan II, 733 F.2d at 921. The district court subsequently denied the International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union's motion to compel compliance with the court's decision,
on the ground that the Union had failed to show irreparable injury. Id. at 921-22. On ap-
peal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted that the shift of focus
to irreparable injury was erroneous and that the district court was empowered to protect
appellants "where an administrative agency plainly neglect[ed] the terms of a mandate." Id.
at 922. The court remanded the case for a determination of whether the "emergency" rule
violated the court's mandate in Donovan L Id. at 923. In doing so, it expressed its opinion
that "[s]uch an attempt to circumvent a lawful order . . . does not satisfy the requirement
of reasoned decisionmaking. ... Id.
Public Citizens concerned the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's sus-
pension of tire treadwear grading requirements. Id. at 93. The court noted the existence of a
13-year gap between the congressional mandate and implementation of tire testing regula-
tions by NHTSA. 733 F.2d at 94. In discussing the side-stepping effect of the 1975 regula-
tions promulgated by the agency, the court noted:
The regulations did not require tire manufacturers to use the actual grade derived
from the federal road test in advertising their tires to the public. Rather, the fed-
eral test grade reflected a minimum level of performance that the manufacturers
would guarantee to their customers. The manufacturers were free to assign lower
grades than those determined by the federal test . . ..
Id. at 95. Finding the defendant's "indefinite suspension" of the requirements in question
arbitrary and capricious, the court noted that "[i]t is hard to imagine a more sorry perform-
ance of a congressional mandate" and "[w]e cannot imagine a more complete flouting of the
statutory scheme." Id. at 105.
56 See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text.
17 See Poe v. Ullman 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan
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sis, 58 requiring that governmental action be substantially related to
an important governmental purpose, is the proper standard of re-
view. Use of the middle-tier analysis is consistent with the "arbi-
trariness" standard articulated in Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's
Association v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.5 9
State Farm concerned the revocation of a regulation requiring
passive restraints in new cars.6 0 The Court held that the action of
the agency was "arbitrary and capricious" because the agency
failed to provide an adequate basis and explanation for the rescis-
sion 1 While the Court noted that the scope of review should not
be enlarged beyond that established by law, Justice White ob-
served that the minimum rationality due process analysis was in-
sufficient for reviewing agency decisions.2 It was asserted that
some reasoned explanation and documentation is necessary to en-
sure the protection of constitutional guarantees.6 3
While State Farm arguably applies only to the rescission of
safety regulations, it is submitted that the standard of review set
forth therein is the minimum standard to be applied to deregu-
latory activity affecting the fundamental rights of liberty and prop-
erty. Although the compelling state interest standard may be too
burdensome, the State Farm arbitrariness standard at least re-
quires a greater effort at reasoned decisionmaking on the part of
considered the due process clause a versatile instrument of justice, ready to abort arbitrary
conduct in whatever form it took:
[T]he full scope of the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be
found in or limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees elsewhere pro-
vided in the Constitution. This "liberty" is not a series of isolated points pricked
out in terms of the taking of property; the freedom of speech, press, and religion;
the right to keep and bear arms; the freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures; and so on. It is a rational continuum which, broadly speaking, includes a
freedom from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints,...
and which also recognizes, what a reasonable and sensitive judgment must, that
certain interests require particularly careful scrutiny of the state needs asserted to
justify their abridgment.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Note, supra note 32, at 628 (judicial review of inaction that
results in nonimplementation necessary to preserve integrity of judicial system); cf. Public
Serv. Health Group v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1157-59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (while slow rulemak-
ing does not always necessitate judicial intervention, courts will be more apt to step in when
there is risk of grave danger).
11 See supra note 51.
0 463 U.S. 29, - , 103 S. Ct. 2856, 2865-66 (1983).
60 Id. at 2864.
Id. at 2868-73.
02 Id. at 2866 n.9.
Id. at 2866-67.
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the agency.4
CONCLUSION
The Reagan Administration's program of deregulation argua-
bly has had a beneficial impact on the American economy. Never-
theless, the exercise of executive discretion must not exceed consti-
tutional bounds. It is imperative, therefore, that the courts pay
particular attention to the deregulatory activities of federal admin-
istrative agencies so that the desire to stimulate efficiency and eco-
nomic growth does not supersede the need to conform to statutory
and constitutional requirements.
To this end, this Note has suggested that, in light of OMB
intervention in agency rule rescissions, judicial review for arbitrary
and capricious decisionmaking should be strictly maintained. Fur-
thermore, to satisfy the requirements of due process, this judicial
review should determine whether the deregulatory activity is sub-
stantially related to an important governmental purpose when that
activity affects fundamental rights of liberty and property.
Michael J. Cammarota
64 See O'Reilly, supra note 6, at 533. Governmental actions that affect fundamental
constitutional rights, such as liberty and property, are generally subjected to strict scrutiny,
that is, the "compelling state interest" test. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, supra
note 50, at 457. However, if a court were to require proof of a compelling state interest to
justify deregulation, the burden of proof would be so difficult to satisfy that the regulations
could possibly become permanent. See O'Reilly, supra note 6, at 533. On the other hand,
the rational relation test has been traditionally considered weak, see J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA,
& J. YOUNG, supra note 50, at 719, and it has been noted that a low-level standard of review
would only encourage arbitrary and politically oriented agency action, see O'Reilly, supra
note 6, at 543.
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